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INTRODUCTION
There are now unmistakeable signs of movement
towards political liberalization and more representative
and accountable government in sub-Saharan Africa.
While the political benefits are unambiguous, there is a
strong expectation that these political reforms will
result in better economic and social performance. This
is an expectation of many African politicians and the
major aid donors, especially if the political reforms are
accompanied by recourse to greater market systems of
allocation. How plausible is this expectation?
There has been a long debate conducted by political
scientists, political philosophers and political economists
on whether democracy or authoritarian rule is more
likely to be compatible with development. There is also
a substantial empirical literature which has tried to test
past experience in developing countries against
hypotheses about regime type and economic growth
and equality.'
It is important to distinguish between the implications
of regime type for (a) the economic and social
performance of the countries concerned and (b) the
type and quality of state economic policy and
management of public resources. Much past empirical
work has focused on the former. Indeed some scholars
would take the view that the performance of different
regimes can only be judged on the final outcomes in
terms of economic growth or equitable income
distribution or quality of life indicators (Sirowy and
Inkeles 1990). Performance can also be measured in
terms of intermediate outcomes such as inflation,
savings and investment rates or exports which are
highly relevant to final outcomes. However, final
outcomes are much affected by factors beyond the
control of governments. It is therefore more useful to
examine the effect of regime type on the character of
public policy management.2
We know that the following factors have influenced the
economic growth and development of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and these in turn are subject to direct
influence and control by state élites who may behave
differently under different political cultures:
Domestic political stability, a reasonably peaceful
and predictable environment for trade and production
I Some of this literature has been reviewed in Healey and Robinson
(1992).
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in which goods and services, people and capital, can
move relatively easily and safely, and contracts can be
entered into and enforced ('predictability' and 'the rule
of law').
Appropriate and effectively implemented economic
policy, especially the relative importance given to freely
functioning markets offering incentives rather than
obstacles to private economic activity, entrepreneurship
and investment.
The way public resources are mobilized, allocated
and used, and the efficiency with which essential public
services are operated.
In this article we are primarily concerned with the
influence of political reform on economic policy
formation and public resource management. We
speculate on how political system changes may impact
on public policy and draw on past evidence from both
Africa and wider developing country experience for
some indications on prospects.
POLITICAL REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY
We consider political reform to mean changes which
have some or all of the following characteristics:
Political liberalization: greater freedom for the
individual from arbitrary arrest; greater freedom of
association; freedom to advocate political alternatives
and to criticize without fear; constitutional changes
which break the monopoly of the single party or ruling
élite and allow non-violent competition betweeen
ruling and opposition parties through periodic, free
and fair systems of elections.
Greater political accountability: more transparent
and open state procedures; greater willingness of the
state executive to consult a wide range of interests in
society before taking major policy decisions and other
actions; and limits on the tenure of the chief executive.
Among the countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the last
few years the rate of political liberalization has varied
considerably. Few regimes as yet have shown much
evidence of open, consultative, accountable political
behaviour. However, some (e.g. Zambia, Cape Verde,
Benin) have already implemented fairly radical
constitutional reforms and held free and fair multi-
2 For an empirical assessment see Healey, Ketley and Robinson (1992).
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party elections in which the ruling party has been voted
out of office. Some have accepted the principle of
multi-party elections but are following protracted
paths towards them (e.g. Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya,
Cameroon). Others have still to accept these more
democratic principles (e.g. Malawi, Zaire).
Our assessment of prospects for improved economic
policy formation and public sector resource manage-
ment has certain features and limitations. First, the
approach is rather formal. Adequate answers to some of
the questions require deeper knowledge and insight
into African culture and politics. Second, the
speculation is about the effects of political change over
the whole decade of the l990s, looking to a time when
the governments of African countries will have greater
freedom in the handling of domestic economic policy
and public expenditure. Currently the external
agencies are thought to have more influence over these
areas than at any time in the past.3 Third, we need to
look back to the 'perceived weaknesses' of the policy
process in sub-Saharan Africa in the l970s prior to the
much greater external financial and aid influence on
policy formation since this gives a more realistic
starting point when looking at domestic prospects (see
Killick 1992). Fourth, we draw on studies of the
developing world during the post-independence
period, with all the qualifications implicit in assuming
that past experience will be some guide to the future in
one specific and perhaps unique continent.
We look at three major areas of weakness in the policy
making process and the content of policies in sub-
Saharan Africa as a starting point for exploring how far
these may improve with political reform in the 1 990s.4
a An inflexible policy agenda which failed to adapt to,
or be more appropriate to, the needs and changing
conditions of African economies.
b Inadequate scope for market pricing and allocation
mechanisms.
C Poor policy design, implementation and lack of
credibility due to unpredictability and inconsistency of
policies as well as arbitrary implementation.
d Weak management of public sector finances with
lack of control over public sector budget deficits;
We must not exaggerate the influence of foreign aid and finance
agencies. The initiation of new economic policy agendas that have
occurred in a number of countries in the l980s has largely been a
domestic political decision even if the design and content of the
policy has been subject to much external influence (Nelson 1990) and
policy changes have been only partially influenced by conditions
attached to extemal flows (Mosely, Harrigan and Toye 1991).
See Healey and Robinson (1992), Chs. 4 and 5 for a review of the
literature on the political explanations of policy making in the 1970s
and 1980s. See also World Bank (1989).
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financing instruments for public expenditure which
stimulated excessive inflation and did not encourage
public savings; public expenditure allocation and use
which did not pay enough attention to efficiency and
productivity.
ADAPTABLE AGENDAS
A major puzzle for much of the later l970s and early
1 980s for observers of the African economic scene was
why so many regimes persisted with policy agendas
which were manifestly not appropriate to the
conditions facing their countries even if they may
conceivably have been so when first introduced. Since
this was a period when authoritarian regimes were well
established in many African countries it is reasonable to
ask whether experience might have been different
under systems with (a) more freedom and less
repression and (b) more competitive politics.
There are some strong reasons why political freedom to
scrutinize, express criticism of existing policy without
fear of retribution and to air alternative ideas and
agendas, seem a necessary condition in Africa for more
adaptable state policy making in future. First, policy
making has been very state centred, with small closed
élites making decisions with little or no wider
consultation. Second, the civil service has tended to
lack the independence, influence and skills to make the
political leadership conscious of the need for alternative
approaches. Third, the centralized power of autocratic
political leaders and their adherence to certain
approaches has often limited feedback of what was
going wrong with existing policies and hence slowed
the process of modifying or reversing economic
strategies. Fourth, the weakness in the organization,
resources and effective lobbying of civil society groups,
including modern economic interest and pressure
groups such as business organizations and trade unions
in most African countries, means there were no strong
pressures from outside, or from below, on the policy
making élites. These groups would no doubt have been
stronger and more articulate were it not for repression
as well as processes of co-optation.5 The lack of
freedom of expression discouraged the development of
professional and other institutional capabilities which
might have generated a more lively and informed
debate on the working of policy agendas. Some interest
Some scholars do not accept that the relatively weak non-state social
groups in sub-Saharan Africa have been passive. According to Bayart
(1986: 113-4) '. . . the state has been damaged by the constant
pressure of those social groups and their ever-changing tactics:
revolts, refusal to grow certain crops, declining productivity, strikes,
abstention from elections, migrations. . . smuggling, the flourishing
of informal exchange . . . Civil society takes its revenge on the state
and contributes in no small measure to its economic failure.'
However to rely on 'exit' rather than 'voice' to change ineffective and
irrelevant official policy agendas risks great delay in the process and
for some rulers an apparent willingness to allow unimpeded decline.
groups which might have favoured different policy
agendas (e.g. ethnic minority business groups) would
have been muted by the generally repressive and
threatening climate.
Other interest groups which may have been better-off
under a different, perhaps more liberal economic policy
agenda, were probably more bought off by patronage,
subsidy or protection than discouraged by an illiberal
atmosphere.
Political liberalization would seem therefore to be a
necessary condition for more flexible policy agendas,
but it seems unlikely to be a sufficient one. The relative
weakness of civil society interest and pressure groups in
most African societies means that freedom to voice
concerns and interests alone may not place sufficient
pressure on state executives. The latter are not likely
voluntarily to seek or encourage consultation of outside
interests unless they are put under strong pressure. In
Zambia, for example, even before the recent political
reforms, the press and specific interest groups were
able to express criticism of ministers and their policies
(though not the President) under certain conventions
(Lungu 1986). Yet this unusual feature in Africa did
not ensure timely change in the economic agenda for
diversification, budget control, or other long overdue
economic reforms.
The single party system has suppressed public debate
of alternative policy options. Where national assemblies
exist under single party systems, they often consist of
appointed or co-opted members as much as elected
ones. A climate of greater freedom of expression in this
situation is therefore unlikely to have much impact on
the scrutiny and debate of policy agendas. Even where
members are locally elected and genuinely represent
constituencies, this is probably still true. Personalities
rather than issues have been mainly at stake in both past
and recent elections. If issues are prominent they have
been local rather than national ones. In any case,
neither freedom of expression nor representation seems
enough to ensure an effective role for legislatures in
making and scrutinizing policy. They must have
effective power of approval over policies and laws
proposed by the executive. This only seems likely with
a genuine multi-party system, and hence is contingent
on the existence of a legal opposition which can
potentially take power. But will the introduction of
multi-party systems in Africa, as well as greater
freedom, be sufficient to induce more flexible and
adaptive policy agendas which change in a timely way
and not just under 'crisis' conditions?
The existence of opposition parties or groups which
have a formal basis for gaining power should focus
feedback and criticism on the incumbent regime and its
agenda, discipline the ruling party through its need to
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seek re-election, and encourage modified, differentiated
or completely new policy agendas as a basis for gaining
popularity and access to power via free and fair
elections.
So much for the theory. Limited African experience of
multi-party politics casts some doubt on whether it will
necessarily work out like this. First, in countries where
multi-party politics have prevailed for long periods, the
emergence of different agendas from the opposition
parties has not been a great feature and one party has
tended to dominate. In Botswana - a rare case of
prolonged multi-party politics in Africa - one party
has dominated. It has for many years followed an
agenda founded on prudent macroeconomic policies
which has contributed significantly to the relatively
high long-term economic growth rate. It has also
pursued public policies which preserve a better balance
between rural and urban interests than many other
African economies. Scholars differ on how far
Botswana's policy agenda is explained by its multi-
party politics. Some see the consultative, responsive
and incremental nature of the policy making process as
partly a function of electoral pressures (Harvey and
Lewis 1990). Others point to the weakness of
independent pressure groups, the passivity of the
National Assembly in relation to policy making
(though it has supervised an effective audit mechanism
and a rigorous system of accounting controls) and the
opposition party's lack of interest in raising and
debating alternative policy agendas (Holm 1988).
Diamond (1988) does not believe Botswaia's relatively
successful economic policy record is explained by its
adherence to more democratic procedures, but that the
record gives legitimacy to a ruling political class and a
highly trained, and relatively autonomous, bureaucracy.
Second, in countries like Ghana the implicit
philosophy of 'winner takes all' for its constituents
rather than a battle over policy agendas has
predominated during periods of elected civilian
governments. Economic management does not seem to
have been improved during Ghana's democratic
episodes though there was not really enough time for a
fair trial (Chazan 1988).
Third, any newly legal opposition parties will lack
experience and may not generate well formulated and
workable alternative agendas very quickly. If the new
opposition parties contain a high proportion of those
who have been associated with previous authoritarian
regimes (as some fear in Cameroon and Ghana) they
may lack a new view on development policies quite
apart from their doubtful democratic credentials and
credibility. There is also a more insidious danger. If it is
enough for the opposition merely to criticize and attack
the personalities and actions of the existing, usually
long-term, and unpopular incumbents of state power in
order to gain power themselves, there may be little need
to put forward any constructive alternative agendas in
advance. African electorates, often with low education
levels, very limited knowledge of economic concepts,
and inexperienced in the ways of an electoral
democracy, will hardly put much rigorous pressure on
new parties and successor regimes.
Fourth, how far will democratic politics encourage
opposition parties to develop and research alternative
diagnoses and agendas for multiple national economic
problems? The development of an independent
indigenous 'think-tank' capacity is an important
element which the World Bank and bilateral donors are
sensibly encouraging; it could play a vital role in the
'supply side' of democratic politics in Africa in the
1990s.
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND MARKET-
ORIENTED POLICIES?
Throughout the 1980s, and in some cases on into the
1990s, policy agendas in Africa remained predominantly
committed to administrative regulation, allocation and
pricing, and few countries followed market mechanisms
in key areas such as exchange rate and foreign exchange
management, domestic credit and crop marketing.
There is considerable evidence that this approach
inhibited incentives to better economic performance
and adjustment. Limited shifts have been made in
these policy agendas in the latter half of the 1980s, as
much from external pressures as from conviction.
Looking ahead to the remainder of the decade in Africa,
why should we expect more open, competitive politics
to encourage or to sustain policies which give greater
weight to market allocation and competitive pricing
systems for products and the economy as a whole? The
question is all the more pertinent since the colonial
experience and the association of market and profit
making cultures with foreign entrepreneurs and
exploitation remain powerful influences on the
intellectual position of many educated Africans.
Under more open and liberal political systems there is
reason to think that citizens and interest groups which
wish to exploit their entrepreneurial capacities will
lobby for the greatest freedom and assistance in doing
so. The intensity of this pressure depends rather
crucially on the strength of the indigenous business
class and how little it has depended on making profits
from state protection and monopoly. Such a class has
not been a feature of most African societies.
Little research exists on these particular relationships
for Africa or developing countries as whole. One
problem is the very small sample of countries which
have been reasonably democratic in the developing
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world, while systematic comparable measures of a
liberal economic policy stance are not easy to find. In a
recent empirical study, the authors have assembled and
examined indicators of the degree of state interference
and distortion in pricing systems among both African
countries and most developing countries and how far
these policy indicators related to the nature of each
country's political system (Healey, Ketley and
Robinson 1992). Measures of the observance of
political and civil rights were used for the classification
and ranking of individual countries. The policy
indicators included the size of the fiscal deficit, forms of
taxation, the stability of real effective exchange rates,
and the premium on black market rates.
Few of these policy indicators proved to be
systematically related to any particular categories of
political regime between 1976 and 1988. We concluded
therefore that on present indications there is no clear
assurance that democratic political reform would help
sustain more liberal economic policies in sub-Saharan
Africa, although there is no reason to expect
performance to worsen. The extent of acceptance of
economic liberalism may depend on factors other than
the political rules and procedures. These include the
prevailing ideological perspective of the key political
personalities involved, deep seated cultural orientations,
administrative capacities, particular experience with
such policies in economies which suffer from lack of
natural resources, small markets, poor communications,
vulnerability to external market conditions, etc.
POLICY FORMATION, CONSISTENCY AND
CREDIBILITY
Economic policy formation is the process by which
policy and expenditure measures are chosen to meet
the objectives set by the policy agenda on criteria such
as the scale, probability and timing of their effect in
meeting targets such as inflation reduction, balance of
payments viability, increased savings, and the efficient
allocation of resources. It is also the process by which
consistency between policies is sought so that they
will be mutually reinforcing, and by which trade offs
are made between the effects of different policy
instruments on different objectives and sections of the
population.
How is this process likely to fare under more
competitive politics? A key factor here is the
organization, skills and ethos of the public admini-
stration. The weaknesses and the often declining
standards of public administration in maiy parts of
sub-Saharan Africa may well be more influential in the
policy formation process than the rules for changing
and choosing the political leadership.
The expected greater responsiveness of politicians
under more political competition should also encourage
greater consultation by their bureaucracies, especially
with those who will be affected by the proposed
policies, whether as producers, users or consumers.
The bureaucracy in turn might be more encouraged
and willing to collect information and statistics on the
likely impact of their policies, both existing and
proposed. Politicians who seek election and the support
of their citizens on the basis of performance and not
coercion, may well encourage their public admini-
strators to set up mechanisms and procedures to
consult outside interests in the design and monitoring
of policies and public expenditures. The public will
have a greater inducement to enquire and to know what
is happening in a more liberal society.
It might also be expected that in a more participatory
political environment, the freer articulation and
representation of public policy positions by various
professional, commercial, agricultural and other
interest groups as well as greater public debate,
parliamentary scrutiny and criticism, should inevitably
influence the formation and implementation of
policies, laws and public services.
It is premature to draw conclusions from limited
evidence of current political reform, but there are some
early encouraging signs from Zambia, a very
interesting case study in how major political reform
may work in practice. In the short period since the new
government came to power, mistakes have been made
by inexperienced and over zealous ministers, yet the
press, parliament and other institutions have reacted
quickly. One observer feels that an increasingly
vigorous press, well informed back-benchers, an
independent judiciary and critical clergy more than
make up for lack of a well organized parliamentary
opposition (see Hall 1992).
Whether broader awareness, the increased availability
of information and greater societal pressures will result
in 'better' policy outputs is an even more difficult
question. The management of many sectional pressures
by balancing the interests of one group against another
and achieving some sort of consensus consistent with a
workable policy under democratic rule is not a skill
easily acquired, and African bureaucracies and
politicians have not had all that much practice in doing
so in the past. There is also a difficult borderline in
participatory politics between, on the one hand,
responding to self-interested and often rent-seeking
pressures which are usually not in the interests of the
wider community and, on the other hand, responding
to the legitimate interests of producers and consumers
who are affected by policy change and entitled to have
their views and concerns heard and taken into account
in policy formation and implementation.
To achieve consistency among specific policies is
clearly more difficult under such political conditions,
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as experience showed in the brief period when Ghana
had democratically elected government in 1969-72,
which was 'unable to withstand partisan pressures from
below' and 'public institutions were penetrated by
every conceivable interest' (Chazan 1988: 119-21).
Handling this aspect of policy management is more
difficult when the public administration lacks
independence and knowledge and in some cases is
divided along ethnic lines. A refurbished civil service
will be required in many countries to make effective
policy under democracy. A reformed and revitalized
civil service has not so far been a high priority for
incumbent African political regimes. It seems even
more vital under a more open political system.
Under democratic politics there should be a reduced
element of surprise for private economic agents as well
as more information on likely policies since they should
be aired more fully both before elections, and after
them. Policies should therefore be more credible. In
principle a democratically elected government should
be better understood in what it will try to do and be less
likely to 'trick' its own people (see the section below on
inflationary financing).
Patronage and clientelism have taken much blame for
bad economic policies and poor policy implementation
in sub-Saharan Africa (see especially Hyden 1983;
Joseph 1983; Sandbrook 1985; Herbst 1989).
The pattern of policy has often been frozen in African
countries for long periods because of the ruling
regimes' fears that change in policy and public
expenditure allocations would disturb the narrow
client base and carefully balanced coalitions based on
patronage. In Kenya this has certainly been the case,
most obviously in reaction to the liberalization of grain
marketing (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1991 Vol 2).
The allocation of credit, foreign exchange, public
expenditure and project finance on the basis of
clientelist criteria rather than broader economic or
social priorities are most commonly laid at the door of
the patronage culture. Other policy distortions from
this source include the proliferation of inefficient
parastatal bodies and their weak commercial objectives
and mismanagement.
A key question therefore is what will be the future of
patronage under multi-party politics in sub-Saharan
Africa? One rather sobering reflection is that in
countries like Ghana and Nigeria, patronage became
even more intense during episodes of competitive
politics. We also know that patronage systems are a
strong feature of democratic politics in other
developing countries. For example, some scholars
place a high responsibility on patronage in Indian
democracy for the unproductive handling of public
sector resources (Bardhan 1984). In Jamaica also
clientelism has been a strong feature of competitive
politics though its impact on economic policy and
performance is less clear (Stone 1980). In the
competitive political system of Mauritius, patronage
has not prevented a fairly continuous adjustment of
economic strategy (Shams 1989). An elected govern-
ment will however have a 'legitimacy', which may
reduce reliance on patronage and thus formulate
policies which reflect an economic rationale for the
whole society rather than rents, favours and exceptions
for favoured parts of it. Perhaps the main concern is
that policy agendas of the political parties will depend
too much on their different patronage networks so that
major societal groups will be purposely excluded from
effective representation and benefits under the ruling
single party or coalition as happened in the last
democratic episode in Ghana. This would not be
conducive to political stability, the longevity of
democratic rules, nor policy agendas which serve wider
and national interest objectives. It would also create
uncertainty about the future of any particular policies
implemented and hence their credibility.
THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC FINANCE
Several questions are of relevance here. First, will
increased political competition and openness mean
more responsible control and financing of public sector
deficits? One of the main deficiencies of policy or policy
implementation in the past has been the large and
unpredictable size of budget deficits, and the scale of
recourse to borrowing from the monetary authorities to
finance them. The result has often been the
postponement of the burden of financing public
expenditure and the generation of inflation rates which
have caused much distortion in the economies and
discouraged production for the domestic and export
market as well as foreign investment.
Second, how might this change under more democratic
politics? The judgement clearly depends quite heavily
on whether elected governments think they will ever be
re-elected and hence take a responsible long-term view
of public finances. It also depends on how far
democratically elected governments can handle two
somewhat opposing forces. One is the greater public
expectations which elected (especially new) govern-
ments will face; these will tend to pressure them
towards meeting current demands. The other is their
enjoyment of political legitimacy compared to their
authoritarian, repressive predecessors, which will allow
them to make more difficult economic decisions.
Third, what does comparative experience in developing
countries since the mid-1970s tell us? Healey et al.
(1992) ranked developing countries on indicators of
respect for civil and political rights and found that
those ranked lowest had larger average fiscal deficits as
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a per cent of GDP than those ranked highest on these
political criteria, although the correlations were not
statistically very significant. At the same time, the
proportion of public deficits which are financed by
borrowing from the domestic monetary authorities
were greater in the more authoritarian regimes,
although again the correlation was not statistically
significant.
Some recent work by Edwards and Tabellini (1991)
relates the scale of country budget deficits and their
financing from the monetary authorities to measures of
frequency of both constitutional and irregular
government changes in 52 developing countries for
several periods between 1963 and 1988. One significant
feature of their results is that both the financial
variables appear to be more strongly associated with the
frequency of unconstitutional changes of government
than with frequency of constitutional changes. They
are therefore consistent with the view that constitutional
systems favour governments which, despite frequency
of change, are more fiscally responsible.
We certainly know from much recent work on the
politics of stabilization (Remmer 1986; 1990; Nelson
1990; Mosley et al. 1991; Callaghy 1990) that
democratic regimes have been no more reluctant to
initiate stabilization programmes than authoritarian
ones though there is some evidence to show that more
democratic regimes may have more difficulty in
bringing high inflation under control (Haggard and
Kaufman 1990). Economic stabilization has been
specially difficult in highly polarized societies though
existing research seems ambiguous on whether new
democracies find it more so than established ones.
Fourth, will more representative government affect the
mobilization of public revenues? The largely
authoritarian governments of sub-S aharan Africa have
not been noted for their search for wider and deeper
sources of tax revenue so much as heavy recourse to
inflation taxation. It might be expected that
representative governments - usually being more
legitimate and associated with a respect for the rule of
law - would be more willing and able to extend the tax
system, reduce evasion, increase the tax-take and
perhaps directly tax income and profits in a system
where votes rather than patronage predominantly
determine political support and survival. Authoritarian
governments lacking legitimacy, but having greater
coercive power, might be able to control and enforce
compliance at borders and hence favour higher border
taxation and tax rates. However, none of these
hypotheses, to the extent that they could be tested from
easily available comparative tax data for developing
countries, found any support during the period
1976-88 (Healey et al. 1992). There was no evidence
that the 'total tax-take' was greater in countries with
more liberal and democratic systems. Even allowing for
the influence of structural variables on tax patterns (i.e.
income levels, share of trade, agriculture, mining, etc.),
there was still little to suggest from past experience in
developing countries that we can expect the scale or
pattern of taxation to be any different under a more
liberal political culture.
Fifth, will political reform bring a change in the pattern
of public expenditure? Governments which depend on
keeping and gaining power through elections rather
than repression and coercion appear to devote
relatively less expenditure to defence and security, and
more to social sectors such as health and education,
though evidence is not available separately on primary
expenditures (Healey et al. 1992). Agricultural
expenditures were more weakly related to country
records on political and civil rights. These outcomes
would be expected since more democratic regimes
should be responsive to popular needs, which is
encouraging for Africa. By the same token, such
governments might be expected to disperse their public
expenditure more widely, in rural as well as urban
areas, and would probably seek more neutral terms of
trade between rural and urban activities; but these
presumptions have not yet stood the test of time.
FINAL REFLECTIONS
Political liberalization per se is unlikely to be a
sufficient condition for much improvement in the
quality of policy making and public expenditure
management. A move to full political accountability
with the ending of one party politics is also essential.
The most encouraging feature is that developing
country experience since the mid- 1 970s suggests that
constitutional governments seem more likely to handle
public finances responsibly and have more concern to
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